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Upgrading the Basel standards: from Basel III to Basel IV? 
 
It first describes the evolution of the Basel framework since the first standards were enacted, and 
describes the ongoing revisions of the Basel III framework. Finally the main findings of different 
impact assessments are reminded, as well as the different positions of various stakeholders. This is 
regularly updated and was initially prepared in advance of ECON’s Open Coordinators and Banking 
Union Working Group meeting on 12 October 2016 with Mr. Bill Coen, Secretary General of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
 
From Basel I to Basel III 
Over the last decades, banking regulatory capital requirements have changed substantially. In 1988, 
the first Basel Accord introduced an international standard to compute banks regulatory capital. 
Today, nearly 30 years later, the BCBS (see Box 1) is preparing what has already been coined by 
some as ‘Basel IV’.  
Over the years, capital standards drafted by the BCBS have shifted from simplicity to risk-sensitivity, 
probably at the expense of transparency and comparability of capital positions across banks.  
Basel I 
Defined in 1988, this first Basel Accord had three objectives, according to the BCBS itself: 
 to make sure banks held sufficient capital to cover their risks; 
 to level the playing field among international banks competing cross-border; 
 to facilitate comparability of the capital positions of banks. 
Basel I included a definition of eligible capital and a set of simple risk-weights, depending essentially 
on the institutional nature of banks’ counterparts and not on the intrinsic risks. Basel I focused on 
credit risk. In 1996 it was updated to include a market risk component. At this occasion and for the 
first time within the Basel framework, the recourse to internal models by banks was allowed.  
 
Table 1: Basel I risk metrics 
Counterparts Sovereigns Banks Mortgages Corporates 
Risk-weights 0% 20 % 50 % 100 % 
Source: BCBS 
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Box 1: The governance of the BCBS 
The BCBS was established in 1974. Its seat is in Basel (Switzerland) and its secretariat is 
provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The members of the BCBS are 
central banks and banking supervisors from 27 countries around the globe (essentially the 
G20 countries and a few additional founding countries, including Switzerland). Currently 9 
Member States sit in the BCBS (BE, FR, DE, IT, LU, NL, ES, SE, UK) alongside the ECB which 
represents the EU. The ECB holds two seats as it represents the EU in both its central banking 
and supervisory capacity. The Commission and the European Banking Authority are in-
vited as observers.  
 
The Basel Committee, currently chaired by Stefan Ingves, the governor of the central bank 
of Sweden relies on a number of working groups. It reports for critical decisions to an 
oversight body, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS). The GHOS is 
currently chaired by Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB.  
The European Parliament has underlined the importance of a more integrated EU represen-
tation in international bodies as well as the necessity of a better coordination of Member 
States’ positions in its resolution on ‘The EU role in the framework of international finan-
cial, monetary and regulatory institutions and bodies’, adopted on 12 April 2016. 
Source: BCBS; See also Policy Department In-Depth Analysis: The European Union’s role in International Economic 
Fora, Paper 5: The BCBS 
Group of 
Governors and 
Heads of Supervision
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
27 countries
2 seats for the EU (ECB +SSM)
COM, EBA observers
Secretariat 
(Bank for International Settlements)
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Basel II 
Introduced in 2004, the Basel II 
package introduced a number of 
changes in the framework. It relied 
heavily on self-regulation and 
market discipline. It was built on 
three pillars. As part of pillar 1, 
operational risk was added 
alongside credit risk and market 
risk for the computation of the 
capital ratio. Greater reliance on 
banks internal models was allowed 
when assessing risk. Pillar 2 
corresponded to the supervisory 
review process whereby 
supervisors were entitled to impose 
higher capital requirements on top 
of pillar 1 requirements based on 
supervisory judgement. Basel II 
also introduced disclosure and 
market discipline principles as part 
of its pillar 3.  
 
Basel III  
The 2008 financial crisis triggered 
another wave of reform of capital 
requirements. Both the quantity 
and quality of capital were in-
creased compared to Basel II re-
quirements. The framework also 
introduced elements of countercy-
clicality with the countercyclical 
capital buffer and imposed higher 
capital requirements to systemi-
cally important institutions. A non-
risk based leverage ratio was intro-
duced as well as two liquidity ra-
tios, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) and the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR). An overview of the 
adoption of Basel III in the 
European Union is provided in 
Annex 1 (See also European Par-
liamentary Research Service Brief-
ing: The cost of banking - Recent 
trends in capital requirements, 
July 2016).              Source: European Commission 
Figure 2: Basel III capital requirements 
Figure 1: Basel II three pillars  
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Main revisions of the Basel III framework 
The BCBS initiated in 2012 a comprehensive review of the risk-weighted capital framework, aiming 
at finalizing the Basel III reform package and ensuring its consistent implementation, “which will 
help strengthen the resilience of the global banking system, maintain market confidence in regulatory 
ratios and provide a level playing field for banks operating internationally”. The Regulatory 
Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP) looked at the timely and consistent implementation of 
the Basel framework, and focussed on the consistent calculation of risk-weighted assets under the 
new framework.  
The BCBS analysed separately the banking book, the trading book1 and operational risk. On the basis 
of quantitative / qualitative analysis and extensive consultations, the BCBS proposed several 
amendments to the Basel III framework. Those proposals are described below. 
Figure 3: Main revisions to the Basel III framework 
 
Source: BBVA Research 
 
Capital floors 
 
What was the problem? 
The BCBS started a review of the capital floors. Under the current framework, capital requirements 
cannot be lower than a floor calculated on the basis of the Basel I framework. However this 
framework is now obsolete as, for example, some banks have never been subject to it. In addition, 
the new leverage ratio also act as a floor on the calculation of capital requirements, albeit it does not 
address the same issues (see figure 4). 
 
What is the proposal? 
One option considered is to set an aggregate output floor to be calibrated on the basis of the new 
standardised approaches adopted respectively for the calculation of credit risk, market risk and 
operational risk. Such floor would typically be set at 60-90% of RWA as calculated under the 
standardised approach. However other options such as the calculation of floors at more granular levels 
are also being assessed. 
  
1 The banking book includes all exposures which are not actively traded by the bank and that are expected to be held until they mature.  
They are generally accounted for at historical cost, meaning they are not marked to market. By contrast, the trading book includes 
exposures which are held with an aim at reselling those instrument at a later date: since the remuneration of the bank is also heavily 
reliant on the profit/loss booked by the bank upon sale of the instrument, they are usually booked at market value. The risk management 
of the banking books therefore focusses on the credit risk (probability that the bank does not recover the entirety of interests and 
principal), liquidity risk (maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities) and interest rate risk (sensitiveness of assets and liabilities 
to variations in interest rates), while for trading books risk management focusses on variations in market values, which depend on 
various drivers.   
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Figure 4: Issues addressed by capital floors and leverage ratios 
 
Source: BCBS 
 
Where do we stand? 
Given the impact of output floors on the level of capital requirements, the BCBS had indicated in its 
consultative document on “Reducing variation in credit risk-weighted assets - constraints on the use 
of internal model approaches” that the final design and calibration would be done at a later stage on 
the basis of a comprehensive quantitative impact study. Therefore the overall issue of interactions 
between input floors, output floors and the leverage ratio has yet to be assessed by the BCBS, which 
plans to address it when finalizing its global review of the Basel III framework.  
 
The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book 
 
What was the problem?  
In January 2013 the BCBS analysis of risk-weighted assets for market risks highlighted considerable 
variation in average published RWA based on the market risk framework, while external analysts 
could not accurately assess to what extent such variations were linked to diverging risk profiles or to 
other factors. In particular supervisory decisions as well as modelling choices were crucial in 
explaining variations in RWA calculations. In addition, the theoretical concept of Value-at-Risk 
(VaR), the blurred boundary between banking and trading books, and treatment of credit and liquidity 
risk in trading book positions were seen as structural weaknesses of the Basel III framework2. 
 
What is the proposal? 
The new standards for minimum capital requirements for market risks include a number of 
amendments as listed below: 
- a revised internal models approach, with an enhanced process for supervisory approval as well as a 
stricter assessment of hedging and diversification impacts. The theoretical concept of VaR was 
replaced by the Expected Shortfall (ES) which better captures tail risk. 
- a revised standardised approach, which was made more risk-sensitive; 
- a greater focus on liquidity risk both under the internal models approach and the standardised 
approach, with varying liquidity horizons factored in the calculation. 
- a more objective boundary between banking books and trading books in order to reduce regulatory 
arbitrage.  
In addition, the BCBS proposed in July 2015 to review the framework for credit valuation adjustment 
(CVA) risk: Under the Basel II market risk framework, banks had to hold capital against the 
variability in the market value of their derivatives in the trading book, but there was no requirement 
to hold capital against changes in the financial standing of the issuer of those derivatives, although 
during the financial crisis some changes in the financial standing of issuers turned out to be a major 
source of losses in the derivatives portfolios (via fair value adjustments). The goal of the review was 
2 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Quo Vadis “Basel IV” 
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to ensure better consistency with the overall framework covering the trading book as well as with 
accounting rules and industry practices. 
 
Where do we stand? 
The final standards on market risk were published on 14 January 2016 and will come into effect on 
1 January 2019 (bank reporting by end 2019). The package of banking reforms proposed by the 
Commission on 23 November 2016 implements those standards into EU Law, with few deviations to 
cater for the specificities if the EU economy (see box 1). 
Regarding CVA, a consultative paper was published on 1 July 2015, and further proposals were 
introduced in the March 2016 consultative document on “Reducing variation in credit risk-weighted 
assets - constraints on the use of internal model approaches”. 
 
Box 1: The package of banking reforms unveiled by the Commission on 23 November 2016 
On 23 November 2016 the Commission unveiled a comprehensive package of banking reforms aimed 
at amending both the capital requirements and resolution frameworks; those legislative proposals 
were submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council for their consideration and adoption. 
The main elements of the package are summarized below. 
Regarding the CRR and the CRD, the Commission proposes (i) to introduce a binding minimum 
leverage ratio (set at 3% of total assets) and a binding net stable funding ratio (NSFR, which reports 
the amount of stable funding to the amount of stable assets over a one year horizon, set at minimum 
level of 100%) and (ii) to implement the Basel standards adopted following the fundamental review 
of the trading book. The proposal introduces adjustments to the Basel standards in order to take into 
account several specificities of the EU economy, such as the important role of development banks, 
covered bonds, officially guaranteed export credit, centralized regulated savings, and credit unions in 
financing the real economy. In addition, a simplified approach is proposed for banks with small 
trading books or medium-sized market activities, as well as clear rules to govern the pillar 2 (firm-
specific) capital add-ons, i.e. the creation of a pillar 2 “guidance”, an additional soft requirement that 
banks are invited to comply with in order to cope with “forward looking and remote situation”. 
Contrary to breaches of pillar 1 and pillar 2 requirements, the failure to comply with the capital 
guidance would not lead to automatic supervisory responses, such as restrictions for the payment of 
dividend and discretionary coupons on additional tier 1 instruments. The proposal furthermore 
clarifies that Pillar 2 capital add-ons are not meant to address macro-prudential issues but are confined 
to a purely micro-prudential perspective. 
As regards the resolution frameworks, the banking proposal includes the implementation of the TLAC 
standard (developed by the Financial Stability Board) into EU law, the associated review of the 
MREL framework, as well as the harmonization of the creditors’ hierarchy in order to facilitate the 
implementation of the bail-in tool upon resolution. The proposal aligns the MREL framework with 
the TLAC standard (eligibility of MREL instruments, identification of resolution entities and 
resolution groups, prepositioning of internal MREL...), albeit the pillar 1 requirements introduced by 
the TLAC standard and the subordination criteria only apply to GSIIs. Incidentally, the proposal 
amends article 55 of the BRRD, by introducing the possibility that resolution authorities grant a 
waiver on the obligation to introduce a provision in all contracts governed by third-country law, 
whereby the counterparty recognizes the bail-in power of EU resolution authorities. Banks had long 
complained that article 55 BRRD created disproportionate difficulties in their daily business.  
Finally the package also includes the obligation, for non-EU GSII with significant activities in the 
EU, to establish an intermediate EU parent undertaking in order “to simplify and strengthen the 
resolution process of third-country groups”. 
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The review of the Banking Book: IRBB, securitisation, Standardised Approach, IRB models 
 
What were the problems? 
The aim of the banking book review is very similar to the aim of the trading book review: to ensure 
maximum consistency in risk-weight calculations across banks and jurisdictions, and ensure 
standardised approaches are sophisticated enough to be used as credible backstops when internal 
models are not fit for purpose. In addition, the treatment of securitization was deemed insufficient 
particularly as regards the calibration of risk-weights and the lack of incentives for proper risk 
management.  
 
What are the proposals? 
First, the BCBS has again assessed whether the interest rate risk of the banking book should carry a 
Pillar 1 requirement (minimum level to be complied with by all institutions) or a Pillar 2 requirement 
(bank specific add-on). The new standards update the principles governing the management of 
interest rate risk in the banking book, with more extensive guidance, stricter supervision, and 
enhanced disclosure requirements, but falls short of imposing pillar 1 requirements on interest rate 
risk. 
On securitisation, the BCBS has reviewed and simplified the overall framework, with a new hierarchy 
of approaches, a lower reliance on external ratings, and a significant increase in requirements. In 
addition, the framework was amended to factor-in the Simple, Transparent and Comparable (STC) 
securitisation criteria as defined by the BCBS and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), leading to a reduction in the risk weight floor for senior exposures from 15% 
to 10%. 
The review of the standardised approach has focussed on improving the risk-sensitiveness of the 
measurement while avoiding excessive reliance on external ratings. To start with, some categories of 
exposures have been excluded from the scope of internal rating based (IRB) modelling, in order to 
avoid too much variability (banks, large corporates, specialized lending, equity). The use of external 
ratings would also be subject to the bank carrying out due diligence on the counterparty. The revised 
standardised approach introduces new risk drivers for unrated exposures as well as residential 
mortgages and commercial real estate. One consequence would be to increase capital requirements 
on mortgages with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of more than 0.8 or when the repayment relies on cash 
flows generated by the property, while decreasing requirements for those with low LTV ratio (below 
0.4). 
For the internal models, floors would be introduced on key parameters such as the probability of 
default (PD), the exposure at default (EAD), and the loss given default (LGD). The modelling of PD 
would be stable over time to reduce cyclicality, while a number of amendments to the modelling of 
all parameters aim at improving the comparability between banks.  
 
Where do we stand? 
The standards on interest rate risk in the banking book were published in April 2016, and shall be 
implemented by 2018 (on the basis of data as of 31 December 2017). 
The revision of the securitization framework was finalised in December 2014 and amended in July 
2016 to incorporate the Simple, Transparent and Comparable (STC) securitisation criteria as defined 
by the BCBS and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
In December 2015 the BCBS published its second consultative document on revisions to the 
Standardised Approach for credit risk. Comments were to be submitted by 11 March 2016. 
The BCBS published in April 2016 its second report on risk-weighted assets in the banking book, 
which analyses the variability of RWA for banks using internal models. This was only one week after 
the BCBS had published its consultative document on “Reducing variation in credit risk-weighted 
assets - constraints on the use of internal model approaches”. Comments were to be submitted by 
June 2016.  
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The overall issue of interactions between input floors, output floors and the leverage ratio will be 
assessed by the BCBS when it finalizes its global review of the Basel III framework.  
The revised standardized measurement approach for operational risk 
 
What was the problem? 
In its October 2014 consultative document on Operational risk- revisions to the simpler approaches, 
the BCBS noted: “Despite an increase in the number and severity of operational risk events during 
and after the financial crisis, capital requirements for operational risk have remained stable or even 
fallen for the standardised approaches”. The BCBS therefore concluded that for many banks the 
capital requirements for operational risk were not correctly calculated. 
 
What is the proposal? 
The BCBS proposed to withdraw internal modelling approaches for the calculation of minimum 
capital requirement for operational risks, due to excessive complexity and lack of comparability. The 
BCBS has proposed the Standardised Measurement Approach as a single and non-model based 
method for assessing operational risk. It relies on a business indicator (based on the three main sources 
of income) and the past performance of the financial institution.  
 
Where do we stand? 
The second consultative document on the Standardised Measurement Approach for operational risk 
was published in March 2016. Stakeholders were requested to submit comments by 3 June 2016. The 
BCBS intends to publish the final standard once the outcome of both the Quantitative Impact Study 
and the consultation have been assessed. 
 
In addition: leverage ratio, disclosure requirements under pillar 3, sovereign exposures, etc... 
 
The work programme of the BCBS is not limited to the trading book, banking book and operational 
risks. It also covers, inter alia: 
- disclosure requirements under pillar 3: on 11 March 2016 the BCBS consulted on new 
proposals aimed at improving the quality and granularity of disclosure requirements; 
- amendments to the calculation of the leverage ratio, as well as a proposal to introduce higher 
requirements for GSIBs; 
- the revision of the supervisory framework for measuring and controlling large exposures;  
- the treatment of sovereign exposures, which is still under review. 
Therefore the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP) constitutes a rather 
comprehensive review of the Basel III framework, which impact on banks’ capital requirements may 
be substantial, alongside the impact of other reforms at global level such as the new requirements for 
total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC, see EGOV briefing PE 574.408). This explains why some 
stakeholders present it as a new “Basel IV” framework, albeit overall it remains a collection of 
refinements, additions and further specifications to the Basel III framework. The next section 
summarizes the impact assessment studies carried out by the BCBS and other stakeholders. 
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Impact assessments 
Fundamental review of the trading book – interim impact analysis 
In October 2013, the Basel Committee set out a consultative paper on the fundamental review of 
capital requirements for banks’ trading books, suggesting a revised market risk framework. In 
order to better understand the capital impact of the proposed new market risk framework, Basel Com-
mittee carried out a trading book quantitative impact study, and reported on the results in November 
2015.  
Based on a sample of 44 banks that voluntarily provided usable data, the impact study concluded that 
the proposed framework would on average result in a 4.7% increase in overall capital requirements 
(the Basel III aggregate covering credit risk, operational risk, market risk etc.). That result is, 
however, mainly driven by the influence of a single “outlier”, i.e. a large bank with considerable 
trading activities and a significant proportion of market risk-weighted assets.  
Figure 5: Impact of the fundamental review of the trading book on total risk weighted assets in 
a sample of 44 banks 
 
Source: Fundamental review of the trading book – interim impact analysis, Basel Committee November 2015, p. 3 
If that bank was excluded from the sample, the overall capital requirements would increase by just 
2.3% (compare distribution in figure 5). 
Looking specifically at the segment of capital charges covering the aggregate market risk, the 
proposed standard would result in a weighted average increase of 74% when compared with the 
current market risk framework. That effect, however, is much smaller when calculated as a simple 
average (increase of 41%), or when calculated for the median bank in the same sample (increase of 
18%). 
Furthermore, when taking into account the further calibration refinements endorsed by the BCBS in 
December 2015, the weighted average increase in market risks RWA is reduced to 40%, with a 
median increase of 22%. This means the final arbitrages have softened the impact for banks with 
important trading activities.  
As observed in figure 5 the revised market risk framework would for many banks only have a limited 
impact on total capital requirements as market risk RWAs makes up for only a small part of total 
RWAs. 
Still, the Global Financial Markets Association, the Institute of International Finance and the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, for example, worried in a joint feedback that the 
rules may have a negative effect on banks’ capital markets activities and reduce market liquidity, 
claiming that the capital increases indicated by the impact study were not in line with the Basel 
Committee’s reassurance that overall capital requirements would not significantly increase. 
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Consultation and stakeholders’ reaction to the planned constraints on the use of internal models 
As explained in the previous section, the Basel Committee proposes to: 
 remove the option to use internal models for certain exposures, 
 adopt certain minimum model parameters (floors), and 
 provide greater specification of parameter estimation practices. 
The option to use the internal models (instead of the standardised approach to credit risk) shall be 
removed where model parameters cannot be estimated with sufficient reliability. For example, large 
corporates, banks, and other financial institutions are usually considered to be low-default exposures. 
For low-default exposures, however, it is difficult to reliably estimate probabilities of default. Hence, 
in future the standardised approach to credit risk shall be used for exposures to large corporates (with 
total assets exceeding EUR50bn), banks, or other financial institutions, rather than internal models. 
Sovereign bonds are another example of low-default exposures, yet they are subject to an ongoing 
separate review. 
The public consultation on the consultative document closed on 24 June 2016. All comments that had 
not asked for confidential treatment were published on a dedicated website. 
A cursory review of the comments received indicates that most European banks and banking associ-
ations, repeatedly raise the following two issues (as can, for example, be seen in the feedback by the 
British Bankers Association or the European Association of Co-operative Banks): 
 there is the argument that the proposals - the constraints on the use of internal risk models and 
the proposed floors - lead to reduced risk sensitivity, incentivising banks to focus their lending 
on riskier asset classes; 
 and the argument that a Quantitative Impact Study needs to be completed to better understand 
the likely impact of the proposals on overall levels of bank capital held against credit risk, 
respectively the concern that the proposals will have a significant impact on the overall level 
of required capital3.  
On the other hand, those demurs are, for example, neither shared by Finance Watch, a non-profit 
public interest organisation, nor by the Customer-Owned Banking Association, which represents 
smaller Australian banking institutions that use the standardised approach rather than internal models, 
nor by the credit card company American Express which promotes the idea to eliminate the use of 
internal models altogether. 
A more elaborate review of the arguments related to the system of floors and constraints on the use 
of internal models can be expected from the external briefings which ECON Coordinators asked the 
banking expert panel members to provide before the Public hearing with Ms Nouy, Chair of the SSM, 
scheduled for 9 November 2016. Those papers have been published on the Banking Supervision web-
site of the ECON committee. 
The position of the European Commission  
In an unusual move against the work of the BCBS, Valdis Dombrovskis, European Commissioner 
for financial markets, financial stability and capital markets, expressed, in late September 2016, stark 
criticism of the latest proposals put forward by the BCBS, notably regarding capital floors and the 
aim to limit the flexibility of internal modelling. According to Commissioner Dombrovskis, 
significant increases in capital requirements are not appropriate in current circumstances in the EU, 
and risk putting European banks at a disadvantage. This refers to the fact that, contrary to business 
practices observed in some other jurisdiction, EU banks hold more exposure to counterparties which 
would be negatively impacted by the recent proposals. In particular, EU banks hold on average more 
3 In November 2016 PwC has published an analysis of the overall impact of the current proposals. The new framework would increase 
RWA by 40 to 65% (EUR 5-7 trillion) for European banks according to this study. 
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exposures to residential mortgages and large corporates, since in the United States large corporates 
rely less on bank credit and residential mortgages exposures are offloaded to federal agencies. 
Conversely the United States and Switzerland argue that the proposed new rules are essential to avoid 
banks continue gaming the calculation of risk weighted assets.  
Council conclusions on finalizing the post crisis Basel reforms 
On 12 July, the Council had also published conclusions on the completion of work on post-crisis 
banking reform, stating that it supports the work by the Basel Committee to refine elements of the 
Basel III framework, stressing the importance to carefully assess the design and calibration of the 
reform package, and noting that the reform package would not be expected to result in a significant 
increase in the overall capital requirements for the banking sector. 
Resolution of the European Parliament on 23 November 2016 
On 23 November 2016 the European Parliament adopted one resolution on the finalisation of Basel 
III. The European Parliament underlined the need to consider carefully the impact of the proposed 
reforms, and to promote a level-playing field at global level while paying attention to the peculiarities 
of the EU economy and of European banking models.  
State of play 
The 19th International Conference of Banking Supervisors took place in Santiago (Chile) from 28 
November to 1 December 2016. Attendants discussed the global standards and the new regulatory 
framework for the forthcoming years. The conference was preceded by several weeks of lobbying by 
different stakeholders, with Europeans banking associations warning against the impact of the 
proposed reforms (for example a joint position paper by the French and German banking associations, 
following another joint paper by the Dutch, Finnish, Danish and Swedish federations). In particular, 
those banking associations complain that the output floor would make the new standard risk-
insensitive and put the financing of the European economy in jeopardy.  
On 3 January 2017, the GHOS (Group of Central Banks Governors and Heads of Supervision), 
oversight body of the Basel Committee, announced that it needed more time to finalize the package 
of proposals, and decided to postpone their meeting originally planned for early January 2017.  
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Annex 1: BCBS Eleventh report on adoption of the Basel regulatory framework  
 
On 19 October 2016 the BCBS published its eleventh report on the adoption of the Basel regulatory 
framework, which focuses on the status of adoption of the Basel III framework.  
Table 2: Overview table on the adoption of Basel III in the European Union 
 
Number code: 1 = draft regulation not published; 2 = draft regulation published; 3 = final rule published; 4 = final rule in 
force (published and implemented by banks). Standards for which the agreed implementation deadline has passed receive 
a colour code to reflect the status of implementation: green = adoption completed; yellow = adoption in process (draft 
regulation published); red = adoption not started; N/A = not applicable. 
Source: BCBS 
